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Suggestions for the Consideration of the
Council of the Louisiana State Institute
HARRIET S. DAGGETT*
The readers of this journal are familiar with the organization
known as the Louisiana Law Institute created by Act 166 of 1938
"as an official advisory law revision commission, law reform and
legal research agency of the State of Louisiana." (La. Act 166 of
1938, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9284.18]). The publications of the
results of the Institute's legal research, a compilation of the three
Civil Codes of Louisiana and a compilation of the Louisiana
Statutes related to the Civil Code, are available. The Institute's
draft of a criminal code, undertaken at special legislative man-
date under the terms of Act No. 7 of 1940 is now the Criminal
Code of Louisiana by virtue of Act No. 47 of 1942.
In addition to tasks of this nature, the Institute is instructed
by Act No. 66 of 1938 to recommend to the legislature such
changes in the law as are thought desirable and in accordance
with this duty certain proposed bills have been offered to each
regular session of the legislature for their consideration. Follow-
ing this procedure, the Council of the Institute is presently en-
gaged in preparing their recommendations for the 1944 session
of the legislature to the Institute which, after approval by the
Institute, will be transmitted to the law making body. Interest
in the Institute's program having been evidenced by non-Institute
members of the bar, the acting director was asked to prepare a
resume of the work for publication. The report of the Council is
by no means complete. Indeed, much of the material presented
has not yet been even considered by the body. Some suggestions
have been approved in principle, others have been rejected to-
tally or in part. Some of the ideas have reached the first draft
stage, none have gone further than that. Because of this situation,
it appears manifestly unwise and unfair to presentthe Council's
work and appear to in any wise commit this body at an untimely
stage and before any recommendation of theirs is complete. Con-
* Acting Director of Louisiana State Law Institute; Professor of Civil
Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
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sequently, the writer wishes to make very clear the fact that the
following matter is simply a list of suggestions offered to the
Council for consideration. The comments are those of the writer
and any views expressed are individual to the writer. The Council
is in no way responsible or committed by the following mem-
orandum of the acting director, prepared in the regular course
of duty.
OUTLINE
I. An act to provide a central registration system for chat-
tel mortgages.
II. An act to repeal Article 161 prohibiting marriage between
adulterer and co-respondent.
III. An act dealing with inheritance rights in adoption.
IV. An act dealing with tutorship and emancipation of adopted
children.
V. An act dealing with legitimation by marriage of natural
parents.
VI. An act to strike the word "Bastard" from the Code.
VII. An act providing against dissolution of the community by
judgment of separation.
VIII. A resolution for amending the 1921 Constitution deleting
the clause which gives women the right of freedom from
jury service.
IX. An act to amend the Workmen's Compensation Act by
reserving to the persons now designated by Article 2315
a right of action for wrongful death when there are no
dependents of the empioyee.
X. The Uniform Expert Testimony Act.
XI. The Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act.
XII. The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act.
XIII. An Act to amend the Rehearing Statute.
XIV. An act to repeal Article 552.
XV. An act to repeal Article 167.
XVI. An act to amend the law of matrimonial agreements.
XVII. An act to rank privileges.
XVIII. An act to give certain rights to married persons.





To provide a central registration system for chattel mort-
gages.
Comment*
Section 5 of the amendment of 1936, Act No. 178, made a
radical change, so that now the chattel mortgage has to be re-
corded only in the parish where the act of mortgage is executed
and at the domicile of the mortgagor, which recordation affects
all third persons, "both within the parish where recorded and
outside of the parish where recorded, but within the State of
Louisiana."1 The property mortgaged does not necessarily ever
have to be in the parish where the instrument is recorded. Ob-
viously, this throws the hardship on the third person instead of
the mortgagee, and his only protection is the fact that under
Section 8 of Act No. 198 of 1918 a criminal prosecution may be
held over the head of the mortgagor in case he removes the
property without the written consent of the mortgagee. The
property, however, remains subject to the mortgage. If the mort-
gagor has obtained the written consent of the mortgagee to re-
move the property, the purchaser may not resort to a criminal
prosecution. Furthermore, he has not been aided in determining
whether there is a mortgage on the property or not because of the
absence of a requirement that the mortgagee record the act of
mortgage in the mortgage records of the parish to which it is
removed. In addition, the purchaser of any movable property
susceptible of mortgage from a nonresident of his parish must
obtain the usual "affidavit from the person that there is no mort-
gage on the property, nor any money due for the purchase price
thereof.' 2 Failure to do so renders the purchaser personally liable
for. the debt secured on the property; and the obtaining of the
affidavit does not help the purchaser if a mortgage actually ex-
ists, because the mortgage may be enforced against the property
regardless of whether the affidavit so states or not.
An obvious deficiency in this particular 'phase of the statute
is its complete failure to provide for the registration of a mort-
gage covering a nonresident's chattels situated in the state of
This comment with documentations is taken from Louisiana Privileges
and Chattel Mortgage, by Harriet S. Daggett, p. 50 et seq.
1. La, Act 198 of 1918, § 2, as amended by La. Act 178 of 1936.
2. Id. at § 5, as amended by La. Act 178 of 1936.
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Louisiana. As has been pointed out, Section 2 requires recorda-
tion of the original or a certified copy of the act of mortgage in
the office of the recorder of mortgages in the parish where the
act of mortgage is executed, and also at the domicile of the
mortgagor.
In the case of a nonresident it would be impossible to comply
with the requirement that it be recorded at the domicile of the
mortgagor, in which instance the court might hold that recorda-
tion of the act in the parish where it was executed would be suf-
ficient. A contrary holding would greatly decrease the value of
the act with no resulting advantages. The real problem, and a
practical one, arises in those instances where the mortgagor is a
nonresident and the chattel mortgage is executed in another
state. Under the very words of the statute the mortgagee with
notice could not protect himself against the rights which third
persons might acquire on said properties. The necessity for rem-
edying this deficiency is apparent.
The amendment of 1936 merely shifted the burden from the
mortgagee to the buyer or other third party, as has been sug-
gested above, and did not advance the solution of the real prob-
lem-namely, protection of all parties concerned. Furthermore,
these rules are diametrically opposed to the underlying civilian
view prevailing in the state." It is always to be expected when a
common-law device is imported and engrafted upon the civilian
base that perfect harmony will not ensue. If the new device is
sufficiently valuable as a tool to commerce and society, no regrets
need be entertained about sacrifice of revered legal principles,
but if the importation is an imperfect tool and also runs counter
to accepted ideas, doubtful advantage has accrued. The principle
is ingrained among civilian lawyers and laymen that the seller,
rather than the buyer, should be held responsible. The doctrines
of warranty and caveat venditor, as opposed to the common-law
maxim, caveat emptor, are well known principles in the law and
commerce' of Louisiana. The present rules in regard to the rights
or purchasers of chattels burdened with a mortgage are contrary
to the letter and the spirit of Louisiana's law of sales. Perfect
equality of burden and watchfulness may be too idealistic a goal,
but some suggestions from the legislation of other states may be
offered as possibilities for approximating an admittedly desirable
goal.
3. La. Civil Code of 1870, Arts. 3346, 3347.
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The statutes of Oregon,4 California, 5 Idaho," and Nevada7
have incorporated in their chattel mortgage laws central regis-
tration systems. As would be expected, certain variations are
found in these laws. The Oregon law requires any mortgage on
personal property to be recorded or filed in the office of the
county clerk where the mortgaged property is situated and in
such other county or counties as the mortgagee may elect, the
mortgage to be a lien upon the mortgaged property while it is in
any county where the instrument is filed; "provided, that when
the chattel mortgage creates a lien upon any chattel required by
the law to be registered with the secretary of state and a license
thereon issued by him, a certificate of the county clerk must be
made and filed in the office of the secretary of state, and when
such a certificate is so filed, the mortgage lien of such chattel
mortgage is effective and follows the property into any and all
counties of the state."8 Any person may have a certified copy of
a chattel mortgage which has been recorded or filed in the county
where the mortgaged property was situated at the time of the
execution of the mortgage filed with the secretary of state; and
after such certified copy has been filed with the secretary of state,
such mortgage constitutes a lien upon the property wherever
found in the state without the necessity of further recordation.
Where the mortgaged property is removed from the county
or counties in which the mortgage is recorded or filed, the lien
of the mortgage is suspended as to subsequent pi~rchasers and
mortgagees thereof in good faith and for valuable consideration
from and after twenty days from the time of removal, unless
within that twenty days the mortgage has been recorded or filed
in the county to which the property has been removed, or the
mortgagee has taken possession of the property or a certified
copy has been filed with the secretary of state. Such mortgage
lien remains suspended until the mortgage is recorded in the
county to which the property is removed, until the property is
returned to a county in which the mortgage is recorded or filed,
or until the mortgagee takes possession of the property or a certi-
fied copy has been filed with the secretary of state." This law
4. Ore. Code Ann. (1930) §§ 54-201-54-211.
5. Cal. Civil Code (1931) § 2959 et seq.; Cal. Pol. Code (1931) §§ 408, 4130;
Cal. Stats. of 1935, ch. 27, §§ 195-198.
6. Idaho Ann. Code (1932) §§ 44-1001-44-1018.
7. Nev. Hillyer's Comp. Laws (1929) §§ 985-996; Nev. Stats. of 1923, p. 153,
as amended by Nev. Stats. of 1933, p. 259.




contains detailed procedural steps to be followed, as well as a
means of financing such a system without further costs to the
state. Directions for indexing are also given.
The California law involves a more complicated system. All
mortgages of personal property must be recorded in the office of
the county recorder in the county in which the mortgagor resides
and in the county in which the mortgaged property is situated,
or, save in the case of livestock, vehicles (other than motor ve-
hicles) and other migratory chattels, in the county to which it is
removed.10 When the property mortgaged is removed from the
county in which it is situated, the lien is not affected for thirty
days after such removal; but after the expiration of the thirty
days the property mortgaged, except in the case of livestock,
vehicles (other than motor vehicles), and other migratory chat-
tels, is exempt from the operation of the mortgage, except as be-
tween the parties, until either (1) the mortgagee causes the mort-
gage to be recorded in the county to which the property has been
removed, or (2) the mortgagee takes possesion of the property.
If a mortgage of livestock, vehicles (other than motor vehicles),
or any other migratory chattel has been recorded as provided
above, and within thirty days thereafter, a certificate of such
record has been filed by the county recorder with the secretary
of state, the property mortgaged may be removed into any county
without in any way affecting the lien of the mortgagee." In re-
gard to mortgages on livestock, vehicles (other than motor ve-
hicles), and any other migratory chattel, it is the duty of the
county recorder, wherever a mortgage is filed in his office pur-
porting to create a lien upon such objects or when the discharge
or assignment of such a mortgage appears of record, to collect the
additional costs and to make a certificate over his official signa-
ture upon the form prescribed by the secretary of state and trans-
mit the same to the secretary of state, whose duty it is to receive
and file such certificate.'2
California has recently enacted a law providing an exclusive
method for giving constructive notice of a chattel mortgage on a
vehicle required to be registered under the Vehicle Code and
excepting such chattel mortgages from the general provisions of
law relating to the recording of mortgages on personal property.
A copy of the mortgage covering any vehicle required to be reg-
istered under the Vehicle Code must be deposited with the De-
10. Cal. Civil Code (1931) § 2959.
11. Id. at § 2965.
12. Cal. Pol. Code (1931) §§ 408, 4130.
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partment of Motor Vehicles, which deposit constitutes construc-
tive notice of the mortgage and its contents to "all the world."'13
The Idaho law requires 14 the mortgage of personal property
or a true copy thereof to be filed for record with the county re-
corder of the county where such property is located and kept at
the time of the execution of the mortgage. A mortgage once prop-
erly recorded in no event thereafter has to be recorded in a
different county unless the mortgagee grants his written consent
to such removal, in which case it becomes the duty of the mort-
gagee to file for record the mortgage or a true copy thereof, either
(1) in the office of the recorder of the county or counties into
which the property has been removed, or (2) in the office of a
county recorder and the secretary of state. Such recording with
the secretary of state has the same effect as if the mortgage has
been duly filed for record in the office of the recorder of each
county in the state.
The incorporation of a central registration system in the chat-
tel mortgage law of Louisiana based upon some of the better
features contained in the above laws might to a great extent
alleviate the present unsatisfactory condition which necessarily
places the hardship on either the mortgagee or the innocent third
person. The proposed system would provide a definite means of
ascertaining whether or not a chattel mortgage exists on the
property. Louisiana is thoroughly accustomed to a state license
bureau for automotive vehicles. It would be comparatively easy
to take the next step found in California and impose the duty
upon the bureau to record all chattel mortgages on such vehicles.
This duty could be amplified to cover all "migratory" chattels.
Since the cost of recording might be borne by the parties to the
mortgage and the recordation made optional with them, no in-
creased financial burden need be incurred by the state. The ex-
pense might ultimately be borne by the mortgagor of the chattel,
which would be an argument against any additional recordation
fees; but it would seem that with increased security for the mort-
gagee and purchaser, greater facility for use of this security de-
vice would ensue, which would counterbalance additional cost for
recordation and for certifications. A maximum of two registra-
tions is sufficient, however-one in the parish and one in the state
office; or, indeed, on migratory chattels, but one in the state office,
so that fees, regardless of bearer, need be no greater than under
the present system.
13. See Cal. Stats. of 1935, ch. 27, §§ 195-198.





To repeal Article 161.
Comment
Article 161 reads as follows:
"In cases of divorce, on account of adultery, the guilty
party can never contract matrimony with his or her accom-
plice in adultery, under the penalty of being considered and
prosecuted as guilty of the crime of bigamy, and under the
penalty of nullity of the new marriage."
This article did not appear in our Codes of 1808 or 1825. The
statute was first passed in 1827, reenacted in 1855, and incorpo-
rated in the revised code of 1870 as Article 161.
The similar provision of the French Code was repealed on
December 15, 1904.
Louisiana courts checked the chaotic effect which Article 161
might have had on legitimacy, property rights, and the introduc-
tion of scandalous material in the very first case to raise the issue.
Succession of Hernandez, 46 La. Ann. 962, 15 So. 461 (1894). The
court said:
" . . . the principles of Article 161 of the Code, which mani-
festly indicates the necessity of the accomplice being named
and disclosed, as the means of enforcing its behests. If this
were not so, grave and serious injury might result, and the
rights of inheritance, the legitimacy of children, and the secur-
ity of marital rights, as well as the title to property, would
be imperiled by the uncertainty and insecurity of the tenure;
depending, as it would, upon the uncertain recollection of wit-
nesses, long years after the occurrences had happened."
This decision has been reaffirmed and strengthened. See Suc-
cession of Gabisso, 119 La. 704, 44 So. 438 (1907); Succession of
Knupfer, 174 La. 1048, 142 So. 609 (1932). In Succession of Damico,
155 La. 1036, 99 So. 862 (1924) evidence for identification was
allowed which the court in Succession of Knupfer emphatically
stated did not enlarge the rule of the Hernandez case. [142 So.
610, column 2].
In Stallings v. Stallings, 179 La. 663, 154 So. 729 (1934) a wife,
who had previously secured a separation of bed and board from
her husband, was fighting her husband's suit for final divorce,
[Vol. V
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brought under Act 56 of 1932. She alleged that her husband had
* the
... intent to make the court an instrument to enable him to
commit a felony under article 161 of the Civil Code, as his al-
leged purpose in obtaining the divorce is to violate this article
by intermarrying with his paramour and thereby commit the
crime of bigamy."
The court declared this assertion immaterial and granted the
final divorce to the husband under the clear terms of Act 56 of
1932.
In Rhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288, 179 So. 430 (1938), suit was
brought by a husband to annul his marriage to his accomplice in
adultery named in the divorce suit successfully brought against
him by his previous wife. He alleged that he and his accomplice
went out of the state to be married in order to evade the prohibi-
tion of Article 161; that his marriage was void, et cetera. The
court annulled the marriage despite the uncleanliness of the
plaintiff, because of the "prohibitory" rule of 161, apparently in-
fluenced by an Illinois case dealing with a marriage of first
cousins.
Practical and Social Considerations
It would seem then that Article 161 might cause more im-
morality than it averts. Act 25 of 1898 amended and reenacted by
Act 56 of 1932 and the 7-year, 4-year, 2-year divorce laws were
passed to enable erring spouses to apply for voluntary bank-
ruptcy proceedings in connection with their insolvent domestic
affairs-certainly with the purpose of providing a clean slate
upon which to write a new life rather than forcing them to re-
main in a never-never land, often of illicit association.
Marrying the accomplice is about the only decent reparation
possible for the individual or society and is generally thought
desirable by all but the vindictive.
The living in adultery, presumably an immoral state, is not
a crime under our law, while changing this status into the honor-
able one of marriage, after the barrier is removed by a legal
divorce, is a crime under Article 161.
The worst punishment falls upon the child who cannot be
acknowledged (Article 204) or legitimated (Article 198) and who
may only receive alimony (Article 1488). The court slightly tem-
pered the harshness of this rule in Succession of Haydel, 188 La.
646, 177 So. 695 (1937) by upholding the bequest of a father of
1943]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
one-half of his property to his adulterous daughter of six years,
under Article 1488, as not being "excessive" for her maintenance,
and without reference to Article 1496 which delimits the share
which may be donated to such children to a maximum of one-
third, even where only remote collateral relations exist.
The French Code specifically provides for legitimation of
adulterous children by the marriage of their parents when the
child of a married mother has been disavowed by her husband,
and hence made illegitimate, and when married, the father of the
child has no legitimate descendants "born of the marriage during
which the adulterous child has been conceived." [Article 331,
French Civil Code, Cachard's translation.]
SUGGESTION III
AN ACT
To amend and reenact Article 214 dealing with inheritance
rights in adoption.
Comment
After the long series of amendments to Article 214, together
with separate statutes on the subject (See Institute's Compilation,
Louisiana Statutes Related to the Civil Code, p. 712) all that
appears to be left of the article is the following: " . . . but such
adoption shall not interfere with the rights of forced heirs. ...
The person adopted shall have all the rights ofa legitimate child
in the estate of the person adopting him except as above stated."
No other statements regarding inheritance by the child now
appear in the statutes.
Section 6 of Act 428 of 1938 contained the following:
"Upon the entry of the final order of adoption, the said child
shall cease to be heir of its parents, whose obligations toward
it for support shall also cease, and the child shall at the same
time become an heir of its adoptive parents to the extent pro-
vided by existing law."
This sentence is not found in Act 154 of 1943, which specifi-
cally repealed Act 428 of 1938.
Act 256 of 1936 still stands and reads as follows:
"AN ACT conferring on adoptive parents the full rights of in-
heritance of parents, in the estates of their adopted children.
[Vol. V
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"Section 1. Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana,
That adoptive parents shall have all the rights of inheritance
of parents in the estates of their adopted children as are en-
joyed by parents, in the estates of their legitimate children.
"Section 2. That all laws or parts of laws contrary hereto
or in conflict herewith, be, and the same are, hereby repealed."
It is obvious that the latter fails to state what status the blood
parents might continue to have in relation to the child's estate.
The jurisprudence is clear on the point that the child has among
others the right to his legitime. [Succession of Hesser, 37 La. Ann.
839 (1885).]
The Succession of Dielman, 155 La. 503, 99 So. 416 (1924), is
the only case, however, which deals in a clearcut fashion with the
adopted child's right in opposition to asserted claims of the forced
heirs of the blood. The contest in that case was between an
adopted child and the mother of the adopting father, who left a
will giving the residue of his estate to his wife and an adopted
daughter. The court gave the mother her legitime, stating that
two classes or lines of forced heirs existed, the mother and the
adopted daughter.
It would appear then, that if an adopting father left an adopt-
ed child and one legitimate child, and a will necessitating determi-
nation of the forced share, that the legitime of the legitimate child
under 1493 would be one-third and that of the adopted child one-
fourth; that if there was an adopted child and two legitimate chil-
dren that each of the latter would be entitled to one-fourth, while
the adopted child would receive two-ninths, et cetera.
The French code does not cut down the share of the adopted
child when there are legitimate children [Art. 357, French Code]
born after a child has been adopted, but the French law does not
permit adoption when there are already in existence legitimate
children of the persons wishing to adopt. [Article 344, Cachard's
Translation.]
Other United States jurisdictions generally hold the adopted
to be an heir of the adopting parents. See Comment, Louisiana
Law Review, Vol. I, p. 201, note 27.
First drafting problem
Should we leave the present provisions in the Louisiana Civil
Code, making the adopted a forced heir, but prohibiting "interfer-
ence with forced heirs"?
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The writer's thought is that we should, as it is not unfair that
an adopted child should receive a smaller portion in the case of le-
gitimate children of the adopter, and it seems inadvisable to per-
mit the adopted to cut off the legitime of the adopter's parents
where no legitimate children exist.
Second drafting problem
Should the adopted be cut off from the chance of inheritance
from his blood relatives?
While, practically, it might be rare that a person given in
adoption would ever receive anything from his blood parents or
relatives, the thought of the writer is that he should retain his
rights of inheritance.
Third drafting problem
Should the adopted and his legitimate descendants enjoy the
rights of representation?
One phase of this question arose in the case of Salatich v. Hel-
ler in the southern federal district court of California [4 Fed.
Supp. 474 (1933)] and that court's interpretation of the Louisiana
law was that the legitimate child of the deceased adopted could
not represent his parent in the succession of the adopter.
The French law provides as follows:
"Art. 353. The relationship resulting from adoption ex-
tends to the legitimate children of the adopted."
"Art. 357. The adopted and his lawful issue acquire no
rights by succession to the property of the parents of the
adopter. However, they have the same rights to the succession
of the adopter as his issue or legitimate descendants might
have." [French Civil Code, Revised Edition, translation by Ca-
chard, pp. 124, 125.]
The writer's judgment runs with the French law. It seems
fair that an adopter should assume this obligation for the line that
he voluntarily founds. It seems unfair that the ascendants of the
adopter should be forced to assume the obligation of this graft on
their line which is involuntary and which might well be against
their wishes.
Fourth drafting problem




The law as it stands would seem to include these provisions in
the phrase "all the rights of a legitimate child" but if it seems
questionable, the writer's judgment is that the rules should apply
as they affect the estates of the adopter, but not as they might af-
fect the estate of the parents or other relatives of the adopter.
The French articles bearing on the subject appear as follows:
"Art. 357. The adopted and his lawful issue acquire no
rights by succession to. the property of the parents of the
adopter as his issue or legitimate descendants might have.
"Art. 358. If the adopted dies without lawful issue the
things given by the adopter or which have come from his es-
tate, and which exist in kind at the time of the adopted's de-
cease, revert to the adopter or to his descendants, on condition
of contributing to the payment of the debts and without preju-
dice to the rights of third parties.
"Art. 359. If during the life time of the adopter, and after
the death of the adopted, the children or descendants left by
the latter, die without issue, the adopter is entitled to the
things which he has given as is stated in the foregoing article;
but this right belongs to the adopter personally, and does not
extend to his heirs, even in the direct descending line." [French




Granting tutorship rights and emancipatory powers to adopt-
ing parents to the exclusion of natural parents.
Section 1. Be it enacted that after final adoption the adopting
parent or parents, to the exclusion of the blood parents, shall have
in regard to the adopted child all of the rights of natural tutors
including the right of the parent dying last to appoint a tutor by
will. After the death of both adopting parents, no tutor having
been appointed by will, a dative tutor shall be appointed. The
judge may consider the blood parents and relatives in making
appointment to the dative tutorship but is not obliged to appoint
a blood parent nor any relative of the adopted child. Bond shall
be required by all dative tutors for adopted children.
Section 2. All emancipatory powers now vested in natural




Section 3. All laws on the subject of tutorship of adopted chil-




Act 206 of 1920 appeared as follows:
"AN ACT to authorize the appointment in certain cases of
the adoptive father or mother as tutor to an adopted minor
child.
"Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the
State of Louisiana:
"That whenever it becomes necessary to appoint a tutor to
a minor who may have been legally adopted by any person,
the adoptive parent, father or mother, shall have the right to
be appointed tutor to such adopted child in preference to all
other persons, upon complying with the requirements of exist-
ing laws in reference to the appointment and qualification of
natural tutors.
"Section 2. Be it further enacted: That all laws or parts of
laws in conflict herewith be and the same are hereby repealed."
In 1926, by Act 243, Act 206 of 1920 was reenacted and the two
following sections were added:
"Section 2. That it -shall be competent for the adoptive
parent, father or mother, to be appointed and confirmed as
tutor of any adopted minor having property in the State of
Louisiana.
"Section 3. That whenever any person shall have pur-
chased property belonging to a minor, or in which a minor may
be interested, under proceedings in which a minor was repre-
sented by a tutor heretofore appointed under the conditions
specified in Section 2 hereof, said sale shall not be set aside or
annulled because of any illegality or nullity in the appoint-
ment of such tutor unless suit be brought for this purpose
within three months from the time this Act goes into effect,
which prescription of three months shall run against minors,
reserving to minors recourse against their tutors or de facto
tutors."
It would appear that this statute should be rewritten and that
the adopting parents should have the rights of a natural tutor
over the person and the estate of the adopted especially when the
[Vol. V
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child's property came to him as a donation from one of the adopt-
ing parents. The inclusion of powers of emancipation might pre-
vent the use of that device by blood parents to defeat the powers
of the adopting parent.
SUGGESTION V
AN ACT
To amend and reenact Article 198 of the Code dealing with le-
gitimation by marriage of natural parents.
Comment
The article now reads:
"Children born out of marriage, except those who are born
from an incestuous or adulterous connection, may be legiti-
mated by the subsequent marriage of their father and mother,
whenever the latter have legally acknowledged them for their
children, either before their marriage by an act passed before
a notary and two witnesses, or by their contract of marriage
itself."
The Article with suggested amendments would read as fol-
lows:
"Children born out of marriage may be legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of their father and mother, whenever the
latter have formally or informally acknowledged them for
their children either before or after the marriage."
Reasons:
Under the present law natural children must have been ac-
knowledged prior to or concurrently with the" marriage ceremony
of their parents in order for legitimation to result from the mar-
riage of their parents. See Succession of Roach, 155 La. 541, 99 So.
442 (1924); Van Dickson v. Mayfield, 158 La. 529, 104 So. 315 (1925).
Article 198 apparently contemplates formal acknowledgment
while the jurisprudence of more recent years has found informal
acknowledgment by either mother or father sufficient to entitle
natural children to inherit. See Taylor v. Allen, 151 La. 82, 91 So.
635 (1922) (mother) and Succession of Corsey, 171 La. 663, 131 So.
841 (1931) (father).
Under the method of legitimation set forth by Article 200 of
the Code, the presence of forced heirs of the parent of the natural
child blocks such legitimation.
1943]
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Hence there is no machinery for legitimation under certain
circumstances. For example, if F and M had a natural child, mar-
ried thereafter without having first legitimated the child, then had
another child or had a parent or parents living, or had legitimate
children by a previous marriage, they could not legitimate the
natural child.
There seems to be stronger reason why informal acknowledg-
ment should be sufficient for legitimation by marriage than in case
of inheritance as the intention of the parents by virtue of their
marriage is more forcefully demonstrated.
The prohibition against legitimating adulterous or incestuous
children seems superfluous in Article 198, as the parents are
barred from marriage and hence from the use of this method of
legitimation by Articles 94, 95, and 161.
Practical and Social Considerations
Since the fairly recent decisions declaring informal acknowl-
edgment sufficient for inheritance purposes, question has been
raised as to whether the court might not take the same view in in-
terpreting Article 198 on legitimation. Doubt has thus been cast
upon the status of informally acknowledged children whose par-




To strike the word Bastard from the Code.
Comment
This word does not appear in the French Code. It came from
Common Law, previously less vigilant in the protection of indi-
vidual rights of children and women than the Civil Law. The
word adds nothing to the meaning of our law. It is found in arti-
cles of a general nature, and the classification of illegitimates with
which it deals is handled by other specific rules of prohibition. In
many cases the word does not appear in the text of the article but
only in the headnote by an editor of the particular edition. The
present text of Article 182 is as follows:
"Adulterous bastards are those produced by an unlawful
connection between two persons, who, at the time when the
child was conceived, were, either of them or both, connected
by marriage with some other person."
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Using the terminology of the French Code, the article as
amended would appear as follows:
"Adulterous children are those produced by an unlawful
connection between two persons who, at the time when the
child was conceived, were, either of them or both, connected
by marriage with some other person."
The present text of Article 183 is as follows:
"Incestuous bastards are those who are produced by the
illegal connection of two persons who are relations within the
degrees prohibited by law."
The article as amended would appear as follows:
"Incestuous children are those who are produced by the
illegal connection of two persons who are related within the
degrees prohibited by law."
The present text of Article 202 is as follows:
"Illegitimate children who have been acknowledged by
their father, are called natural children; those who have not
been acknowledged by their father, or whose father and moth-
er were incapable of contracting marriage at the time of con-
ception, or whose father is unknown, are contradistinguished
by the appellation of bastards."
The article as amended would appear as follows:
"Illegitimate children who have been acknowledged are
called natural children."
The present text of Article 204 is as follows:
"Bastards-Acknowledgment ineffective.-Such acknowl-
edgment shall not be made in favor of children whose parents
were incapable of contracting marriage at the time of con-
ception."
The article as amended would appear as follows:
"Illegitimate children.-Such acknowledgment shall not
be made in favor of children whose parents were incapable of
contracting marriage at the time of conception."
The present text of Article 209 is as follows:
"In the case where the proof of paternal descent is au-
thorized by the preceding article, the proof may be made in
either of the following ways:
"1. By all kinds of private writings, in which the father




"2. When the father, either in public or in private, has
acknowledged him as his child, or has called him so in conver-
sation, or has caused him to be educated as such;
"3. When the mother of the child was known as living
in a state of concubinage with the father, and resided as such
in his house at the time when the child was conceived."
The article as amended would appear as follows:
"Id. How Made. In the case where the proof of paternal de-
scent is authorized by the preceding article, the proof may be
made in either of the following ways:
"1. By all kinds of private writings in which the father
may have acknowledged the child as his child, or may have
called him so.
"2. When the father, either in public or in private, has
acknowledged him as his child, or has called him so in conver-
sation, or has caused him to be educated as such.
"3. When the mother of the child was known as living in
a state of concubinage with the father, and resided as such in
his house at the time when the child was conceived."
The present text of Article 245 is as follows:
"Alimony-Bastards.-Alimony is due to bastards, though
they be adulterous and incestuous, by the mother and her as-
cendants."
The article as amended would appear as follows:
"Alimony is due children, though they be adulterous and
incestuous, by the mother and her ascendants."
The present text of Article 920 is as follows:
"Bastard, adulterous or incestuous children shall not enjoy
the right of inheriting the estates of their natural father or
mother, in any of the cases above mentioned, the law allowing
them nothing more than a mere alimony."
The article as amended would appear as follows:
"Adulterous or incestuous children shall not enjoy the
right of inheriting the estates of their natural father or mother,
in any of the cases above mentioned, the law allowing them
nothing more than a mere alimony."
Practical and Social Considerations
The word is a curse word and should be reserved for the pri-





To provide that the community be not dissolved by judgment




In every other respect reconciliation wipes out the effect of
the judgment of separation. The Code does not provide for this
effect of the judgment. The court seems to have originally arrived
at this conclusion because the Code does not specifically provide
for reestablishment of the community, while the French Code
does.
See Reichert v. Lloveras, 188 La. 447, 177 So. 569 (1937). For
detailed discussions and citation of authorities, see Comment in
Louisiana Law Review, Vol. I, p. 422 (1939) and The Community
Property System of Louisiana, Daggett, p. 52 (1931).
Practical and Social Considerations
The layman does not understand the present rule, which is
not strange, as it is illogical.
After reconciliation and resumption of ordinary pooling of in-
terests, the task of fact finding, difficult at best, in order to finally
divide community property equitably under the law is practically
impossible.
The change would save abstractors, conveyancers and other
record searchers the task of examination of separation judgments
until and unless final judgment for divorce was found.
The change would save "reconciled" spouses income tax.
The change might encourage reconciliations.
Alternative
AN ACT
To provide for reestablishment of community after dissolution
by judgment of separation.
Comment
This is the French method. It would require additional work
for abstractors, conveyancers, and others. The layman apparently
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does not understand that the community is dissolved by judgment
of separation and hence might be unlikely to think of formally re-
establishing it. If this method should be used, however, it might
be well to. permit all spouses to make property contracts during
marriage, as well as before.
SUGGESTION VIII
A RESOLUTION for amending the Louisiana Constitution of 1921
by deleting the following clause found in Section 41, Article VII,
p. 72 of the 1935 State Edition:
"... provided, however, that no woman shall be drawn for
jury service unless she shall have previously filed with the
clerk of the District Court a written declaration of her desire
to be subject to such service."
Comment
The results of this provision are that women are practically
unavailable for jury service, as very few, either from ignorance of
the provision or lack of a civic duty, file a declaration.
The experience seems to have been in states where it is re-
quired that women serve, that they make excellent jurors. Indeed,
they are considered necessary for reaching just decisions in cases
involving women with whom juries composed entirely of men are
thought sometimes to be too lenient.
It is difficult at all times to get well balanced juries since so
many business and professional men have to be excused. It is par-
ticularly difficult during a war period, as so many men are in the
service or are in defense industries from which time must not be
lost.
Women should share responsibilities while enjoying benefits,
even though these civic duties may be unpleasant.
SUGGESTION IX
AN ACT
To amend the Workmen's Compensation Act, reserving to the
persons now designated by Article 2315 a right of action for




The case of Atchison v. May, 10 So. (2d) 785 (1942) held un-
der the present Workmen's Compensation Act that a brother and
sister, sole heirs of the employee killed by defective machinery
had no right against the employer. They were not dependents of
the deceased and hence could not recover under the Workmen's
Compensation Act which had abrogated their previous right under
Article 2315. It would appear that the legislature in enacting the
Workmen's Compensation law, designed for the social purpose
of spreading the risk of industrial accidents, did not foresee this
result.
Practical and Social Considerations
It seems undesirable that an employer should escape all lia-
bility for fault. During the war period when it is necessary that
all able-bodied persons in a family should be employed, many
cases may arise where there are no dependents. Employers might
tend to become careless in providing proper safeguards and in
using the degree of care which society has a right to expect for
humane reasons and for the best progress of production for the
war effort.
SUGGESTION X
Uniform Expert Testimony Act
AN ACT
To empower any civil or criminal court of Louisiana, in any
case before it in which it deems expert testimony desirable, to
appoint experts to testify therein; to fix the maximum number of
expert witnesses which may be so appointed; to provide the con-
ditions under which expert witnesses may be appointed by the
court or called by the parties; to provide that any expert ap-
pointed by a court or called by a party be given access to any
person, thing or place under investigation and to provide for the
inspection and examination thereof by such experts; to provide
for the making and filing of reports by experts appointed by the
court; to regulate the calling of experts as witnesses and their
examination and cross-examination; to provide for the fixing of
the compensation of expert witnesses appointed by the court and
the payment thereof; to provide for the interpretation and con-
struction of this act so as to make uniform the laws of those juris-
dictions adopting it; to declare the legislative intent as to the
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severability of the provisions of this act and to provide that the
unconstitutionality or invalidity of any provision hereof shall not
affect the validity of any other provision; and to repeal all laws
inconsistent herewith.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana, that,
Section 1. Court Empowered to Appoint Expert Witnesses.
Whenever, in a civil or criminal proceeding, issues arise upon
which the court deems expert evidence is desirable, the court, on
its own motion, or on the request of either the state or the de-
fendant in a criminal proceeding or of any party in a civil pro-
ceeding, may appoint one or more experts, not exceeding three
on each issue, to testify at the trial.
Section 2. Notice When Called by Court. The appointment
of expert witnesses by the court shall be made only after reason-
able notice to the parties to the proceeding of the names and ad-
dresses of the experts proposed for appointment.
Section 3. Notice When Called by Parties. Unless otherwise
authorized by the court, no party shall call a witness who has not
been appointed by the court, to give expert testimony unless that
party has given the court and the adverse party to the proceeding
reasonable notice of the name and address of the expert to be
called.
Section 4. Agreement on Expert Witnesses by Parties. Before
appointing expert witnesses, the court may seek to bring the
parties to an agreement as to the experts desired, and, if the
parties agree, the experts so selected shall be appointed.
Section 5. Inspection and Examination of Subject Matter by
Experts. Expert witnesses appointed by the court shall, at the
request of the court or of any party, make such inspection and
examination of the person or subject matter committed to them
as they deem necessary for the full understanding thereof and
such further reasonable inspection and examination as any party
may request. Reasonable notice shall be given to each party of
the proposed inspection and examination of persons, things, and
places, and each party shall be permitted to be represented at
such inspection and examination. Experts called by the court or
by the parties in the proceeding shall be permitted access to the
persons, things or places under investigation for the purpose of
inspection and examination.
Section 6. Report by Experts and Filing Thereof. The court
may require each expert it has appointed to prepare a written
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report under oath upon the subject he has inspected and exam-
ined. This report shall be placed on file with the clerk of court at
such time as may be fixed by the court and be open to inspection
by any party. By order of the court, or on the request of any
party, the report shall be read, subject to all lawful objections as
to the admissibility of the report or any part thereof, by the wit-
ness at the trial.
Section 7. Conference and Joint Report by Expert Witnesses.
The court may permit or require a conference before the trial on
the part of some or all of the expert witnesses, whether sum-
moned by the court or the parties or both; and two or more of
them may unite in a report which may be introduced at the trial
by any party or by order of the court, subject to all lawful ob-
jections as to the admissibility of the report or any part thereof.
Section 8. Expert Witnesses Called to Testify by Court or
Parties. At the trial the court or any party may call any expert
witness appointed by the court. The fact that he has been ap-
pointed by the court shall be made known to the jury, and he
shall be subject to cross-examination by any party on his quali-
fications and the subject of his testimony. Any party to the pro-
ceeding may also call other expert witnesses, subject to the pro-
vision of Section 3, but the court may impose reasonable limita-
tions upon the number of witnesses so called.
Section 9. Examination of Experts. (1) An expert witness
may be asked to state his inferences, whether these inferences
are based on the witness' personal observation, or on evidence
introduced at the trial and seen or heard by the witness, or on
his technical knowledge of the subject, without first specifying
hypothetically in the question the data on which these inferences
are based.
(2) An expert witness may be required on direct or cross-
examination, to specify the data on which his inferences are
based.
Section 10. Compensation of Expert Witnesses. The com-
pensation of expert witnesses appointed by the court shall be
fixed by the court at a reasonable amount. In criminal proceed-
ings it shall be paid by the parish under the order of the court,
as a part of the costs of the action. In civil proceedings the com-
pensation of experts appointed by the court shall, after it has
been fixed by the court, be paid in equal parts by the opposing
litigants to the clerks of the court at such time as the court shall
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prescribe, and thereafter assessed as costs of the suit. The fee of
an expert witness called by a party but not appointed by the
court shall be paid by the party by whom he was called, and the
amount of such fee shall be disclosed if requested upon cross-
examination. The receipt by any witness appointed by the court
of any compensation other than that fixed by the court, and the
payment of, or the offer or promise by any person to pay such
other compensation shall be unlawful.
Section 11. Uniformity of Interpretation. This act shall be
so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose
to make uniform the laws of those states which enact it.
Section 12. Severability. If any provision of this act or the
application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid,
such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of
the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision
or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are de-
clared to be severable.
Section 13. Short Title. This act may be cited as the Uni-
form Expert Testimony Act.
Section 14. Repeal. All laws or parts of laws inconsistent
herewith are hereby repealed.
SUGGESTION XI
Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act
AN ACT
To require all courts of Louisiana to take judicial notice of
the common and statutory law of every state, territory or other
jurisdiction of the United States and to provide the manner in
which such courts may inform themselves of such laws; to pro-
vide that the determination of such law shall be made by the
court and may be reviewed on appeal; to provide the conditions
under which any party may offer evidence of such foreign law;
to provide that the determination of the laws of foreign states
or countries shall be made by the court; to provide for the inter-
pretation and construction of this statute so as to make uniform




Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana, that,
Section 1. Judicial Notice. Every court of this state shall
take judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every
state, territory and other jurisdiction of the United States.
Section 2. Information of the Court. The court may inform
itself of such laws in such manner as it may deem proper, and
the court may call upon counsel to aid it in obtaining such in-
formation.
Section 3. Ruling Reviewable. The determination of such
laws shall be made by the court and not by the jury, and shall
be reviewable.
Section 4. Evidence as to Laws of Other Jurisdictions. Any
party may also present to the trial court any admissible evidence
of such laws; but, to enable a party to offer evidence of the law
in another jurisdiction or to ask that judicial notice be taken
thereof, reasonable notice shall be given to the adverse parties
either in the pleadings or otherwise.
Section 5. Foreign Country. The law of a jurisdiction other
than those referred to in Section 1 shall be an issue for the court,
but shall not be subject to the foregoing provisions concerning
judicial notice.
Section 6. Interpretation. This act shall be so interpreted
and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uni-
form the law of those states which enact it.
Section 7. Short Title. This act may be cited as the Uniform
Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act.
Section 8. Repeal. All laws or parts of laws inconsistent
herewith are hereby repealed.
SUGGESTION XII
Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act
AN ACT
To provide the conditions under which certain records of
any business may be received as evidence in the courts of this
state; to define the term "business" as employed herein; to pro-
vide for the interpretation and construction of this statute so as
to make uniform the laws of those jurisdictions adopting it; and
to repeal all laws inconsistent herewith.
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Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana, that,
Section 1. Definition. The term "business" shall include
every kind of business, profession, occupation, calling or opera-
tion of institutions, whether carried on for profit or not.
Section 2. Business Records. A record of' an act, condition,
or event, shall, in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if
the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity
and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular
course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or
event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of informa-
tion, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its
admission.
Section 3. Uniformity of Interpretation. This act shall be so
interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
Section 4. Short Title. This act may be cited as the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act.
Section 5. Repeal. All laws or parts of laws which are in-
consistent herewith are hereby repealed.
SUGGESTION XIII
AN ACT
To amend and reenact Article 558 of the Louisiana Code of
Practice.
Article 558 now appears as follows:
"Art. 558. The party who believes himself aggrieved by the
judgment given against him, may, within three judicial days
after such judgment has been rendered, pray for a new trial,
which must be granted if there be good ground for the same;
provided, that said new trial shall be prayed for and passed be-
fore the adjournment of the court."
The article with suggested change would appear as follows:
"Art. 558. The party who believes himself aggrieved by the
judgment rendered against him, may, within three days, exclusive
of Saturdays and legal holidays, after such judgment has been
signed, pray for a new trial, or for a rehearing, which must be





To repeal Article 552 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
The so-called "mine and quarry" article, No. 552 of the Civil
Code, appears as follows:
"The usufructuary has a right to the enjoyment and pro-
ceeds of mines and quarries in the land subject to the usufruct,
if they were actually worked before the commencement of the
usufruct; but he has no right to mines and quarries not open-
ed."
Comment
This article is of Roman origin, when because of primitive
methods, mines were thought to be inexhaustible, and was fought
at the time of the preparation of the Code Napoleon. The projet
prepared by commissioners of the government in the year 8 of the
Republic of France (1800) was said by Laurent to have "ex-
pressed the true principles" in the declaration that "mines and
quarries were not comprised within the usufruct." However, the
old provision again appeared in the Code Napoleon but has since
been modified.
The danger in our time is in regard to equitable distribution
of proceeds from oil and gas wells between usufructuary and
naked owner and in the possible engendering of litigation over
when a mine is open. Without this article it would appear that
oil and gas-properly declared by the court not to be fruits-
would simply be subject to the rules of imperfect usufruct as are
other consumables.




To repeal Article 167 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
Article 167 appears as follows:
"Persons who have attained the age of majority cannot
bind themselves for a longer term than five years."
Comment
This article, first appearing in the Louisiana Civil Code as
Article 60 of the Code of 1825, was designed to regulate servants
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and apprentices and to protect against peonage, but now seems
to redound solely to the employee's disadvantage; 15 to be misap-
plied generally since its concern is with indentured servants only,
while Article 274616 under the title of the letting out of labor or
industry treats of the term of contracts between employer and




To amend and reenact Article 2328.
Every matrimonial agreement must be made by an act before
a notary and two witnesses and to affect third persons without
notice must be recorded in the register for
and
AN ACT
To amend and reenact Article 2329.
Matrimonial agreements may be made by the husband and
wife jointly either before or after the celebration of the marriage.
Comment
Articles 2328 and 2329 presently read as follows:
"Article 2328 [2308] (N 1394). Matrimonial agreements-
Method of executing.-Every matrimonial agreement must be
made by an act before a notary and two witnesses.
"Article 2329 [2309] (N 1394-7). Alteration of agreement
after marriage prohibited-Couples removing into state-Con-
tracts.-Every matrimonial agreement can be altered by the
husband and wife jointly before the celebration of marriage;
but it cannot be altered after the celebration. Provided that in
the case of married couples removing to this State and settling
therein from other States and countries after marriage, they
shall have the right at any time within one year after the
15. See Hill v. Missouri Pacific Railway, 8 F. Supp. 80 (D.C. La. 1934) and
9 Tulane L. Rev. 444 (1935).
16. Art. 2746: "A man can only hire out his services for a certain limited
time, or for the performance of a certain enterprise."
17. See Shaughnessy v. D'Antoni, 100 F.(2d) 422 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938) and 13
Tulane L. Rev. 467 (1939).




passage of this act, or a like period after such settlement in
this State, to make a valid marriage contract, subject in all
other respects to the laws of this State. [As amended, Act 1910,
No. 236.]"
Comment
The outcome of present tax litigation is doubtful. The trend
of the tax administrator and perhaps of congress is against sep-
arate returns by husband and wife by community property. Ben-
der v. Pfaff, 51 S. Ct. 64 (1930) may be overruled by the Supreme
Court of the United States as presently constituted. A device for
partitioning the community and making other property adjust-
ments between the spouses may be timely particularly for the use
of couples in high income brackets. Certainly the community
system should be retained. The Code has detailed provisions for






It seems desirable that an act be passed to establish a definite
rank and eliminate cycles. However, order of priority may prove
to be a very controversial matter.
SUGGESTION XVIII
AN ACT
To provide that a married woman may sue on her individual
contract and may act as a responsible agent for her husband or
the community.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana:
Section 1. That a married woman may sue upon her indi-
vidual contract whether the property of the judgment obtained
be separate or community.
Section 2. That a married woman may be empowered by
the husband to act as a responsible agent for her husband or for
the community and may sue and be sued in such capacity.
Section 3. That nothing herein contained shall change the




This legislation seems to be particularly needed at this time
to expedite the affairs of men in service.
SUGGESTION XIX
AN ACT
To clarify the powers of the father during marriage over the
estate of the minor by amending Article 222 of the Civil Code to
read as follows:
"As administrator of the minor's property the father may
not borrow for the minor, purchase for him immovables, com-
promise respecting his rights, sell, mortgage, grant a servitude
or in any way encumber his property except in the same man-
ner and by pursuing the same forms as in the case of minors
represented by tutors, the father occupying the place and be-
ing clothed with the powers of the tutor.
"An undertutor ad hoc shall be appointed by the court,
contradictorily with whom the proceedings shall be carried
on."
Articles 221 and 222 presently appear as follows:
"Art. 221. The father is, during the marriage, administra-
tor of the estate of his minor children and the mother in case
of his interdiction or absence during said interdiction or ab-
sence.
"He or she shall be accountable both for the property and
revenues of the estates the use of which he or she is not en-
titled to by law and for the property only of the estate the usu-
fruct of which the law gives him or her.
"This administration ceases at the time of the majority or
emancipation of the children, and also ceases upon judicial
separation from bed and board either of the father from the
mother or the mother from the father."
"Art. 222. Property belonging to minors, both of whose
parents are living may be sold or mortgaged, and any other
step may be taken affecting their interests, in the same manner
and by pursuing the same forms as in the case of minors rep-
resented by tutors, the father occupying the place and being
clothed with the powers of the tutor.
"An undertutor ad hoc shall be appointed by the court,
contradictorily with whom the proceedings shall be carried
on."
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